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Abstract
Recently, Liaw et al. proposed a remote user authentication scheme using smartcards. They
claimed a number of features of their scheme, e.g. a dictionary of verification tables is not re-
quired to authenticate users; users can choose their password freely; mutual authentication is
provided between the user and the remote system; the communication cost and the computa-
tional cost are very low; users can update their password after the registration phase; a session
key agreed by the user and the remote system is generated in every session; and the nonce-
based scheme which does not require a timestamp (to solve the serious time synchronization
problem) etc.
In this paper We show that Liaw et al.’s scheme does not stand with various security
requirements and is completely insecure.
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1 Introduction
In insecure communication network a remote user authentication is a tool to authenticate remote
users. Remote user authentication is a process by which a remote system gains access to the remote
resources.
In 1981,Lamport [5] proposed a password based remote user authentication scheme using pass-
word tables to verify the remote user over insecure communication channel. That scheme was not
fulfilling the security requirements in current senario. Since the Lamport’s scheme , several remote
user authentication schemes and improvements [1], [3], [4], [6], [8] have been proposed with and
without smart cards. Some of these schemes are also discussed in a survey [7]. Recently, Liaw et
al. [6] proposed a remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. Their scheme has claimed
a number of features , e.g. a dictionary of verification tables is not required to authenticate users;
users can choose their password freely; mutual authentication is provided between the user and the
remote system; the communication cost and the computational cost are very low; users can update
their password after the registration phase; a session key agreed by the user and the remote system
is generated in every session; and the nonce-based scheme which does not require a timestamp
(to solve the serious time synchronization problem) etc. In this paper We show that Liaw et al.’s
scheme has many security holes and is completely insecure.
2 The Liaw et al.’s scheme
The scheme consists of five phases: registration, login, verification, session and password change.
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2.1 Registration phase
A new user Ui submits identity IDi and password PWi to the remote system for registration. The
remote system computes Ui’s secret information vi = h(IDi, x) and ei = vi ⊕ PWi, where x is a
secret key maintained by the remote system and h(·) is a secure one-way hash function. Then the
remote system writes h(·) and ei into the memory of a smart card and issues the card to Ui.
2.2 Login phase
When Ui wants to log into the remote system, he/she inserts the smart card into the terminal and
enters IDi and PWi. The smart card then performs the following operations:
L1. Generate a random nonce Ni and compute Ci = h(ei ⊕ PWi, Ni).
L2. Send the login message < IDi, Ci, Ni > to the remote system.
2.3 Verification phase
To check the authenticity of < IDi, Ci, Ni >, the remote system checks the validity of IDi. If IDi
is valid, computes v′i = h(IDi, x) and checks whether Ci = h(v
′
i, Ni). Then generates a random
nonce Ns, encrypts the message M = Ev′
i
(Ni, Ns) and sends it back to the card.
The smart card decrypts the message Dei⊕PWi(M) and gets (N
′
i
, N ′s). Then verifies whether N
′
i
=
Ni and N
′
s = Ns. If these checks hold valid, the mutual authentication is done.
2.4 Session phase
This phase involves two public parameters q and α where q is a large prime number and α is a
primitive element mod q. The phase works as follows:
S1. The remote system computes Si = α
Ns mod q and sends Si to the smart card. The smart
card computes Wi = α
Ni mod q and sends Wi to the remote system.
S2. The remote system computes Ks = (Wi)
Ns mod q and, the smart card computes Ku = (Si)
Ni
mod q. It is easy to see that Ks = Ku. Then, the card and the remote system exchange the
data using the session key and ei.
2.5 Password change phase
With this phase Ui can change his/her PWi by the following steps:
S1. Calculate e′i = ei ⊕ PWi ⊕ PW
′
i .
S2. Update ei on the memory of smart card to set e
′
i.
3 Security Weaknesses
1. In registration phase user Ui submits its identity IDi and PasswordPWi to the remote system.
Medium of communication is not described. Is it secure or insecure. In real problems, user
normally uses insecure channel. In such case password PWi is reveled to adversary A in
between.
2. In Login phase, when user Ui keys his identity IDi and Password PWi, smartcard computes
a login message < IDi, Ci, Ni >, Where Ni is a random nonce and Ci = h(ei ⊕ PWi, Ni).
This login message travels through insecure public channels. The adversary A can intercepts
the valid login request < IDi, Ci, Ni >.
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Now, with this infomation, advesary A can play replay attack. He sends < IDi, Ci, Ni > to
the remote system at any time, as a login request . To validate < IDi, Ci, Ni >, the remote
system does the following:
- Checks the validity of IDi.
- Computes v′i = h(IDi, x) and checks whether Ci = h(v
′
i, Ni). Note this point, there is
no check at the server side which prevents the reuse of nonce Ni, which was already used
in some previous login. Thus the server is unable to decide whether the Ci is coming
from a legitimate user or from an adversary. It is obvious that system authenticates the
login request.
- The remote system generates a nonce N∗s and encrypts the message M = Ev′i(Ni, N
∗
s ),
then sends < M > back to the communicating party (that is advesary A here and is
impersonating the legtimate user).
- Now, A will just reply ’OK’ and will enjoy the access to the remote system. Therefore,
ultimately the concept of mutual authentication fails on both side.
3. In above paragraph, adversary A, has knowledge of login request < IDi, Ci, Ni >. If he is
able to access user’s smartcard any how, he can recover the infomation ei, which is stored on
smartcard. Now having knowledge of Ci and ei, the adversary can perform offline attack, as
he knows Three variables of the equation Ci = h(ei ⊕ PWi, Ni). He can hit and try various
combination of passwords.
4. Session phase of Liaw et al.’s scheme is suffered from man-in-the-middle attack while the user
and server are establishing common session key. It works as -
1. The remote system computes xS = α
N
∗
s mod q and communicates xS . The adversary
A computes xA = α
Ni mod q and sends xA to the remote system.
2. The remote system computes Ks = (xA)
N
∗
s mod q and A computes Ka = (xS)
Ni mod q.
It is easy to see that Ks = Ka. Now with the help of other public parameters adversary
can communicate with server in encrypted way.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown various security holes of the Liaw et al.’s scheme.
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